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So vertue giv’n for lost,
Deprest, and overthrown, as seem’d,
Like that self-begott’n bird
In the Arabian woods embost,
That no second knows nor third,
And lay e’re while a Holocaust,
From out her ashie womb now teem’d
Revives, reflourishes, then vigorous most
When most unactive deem’d,
And though her body die, her fame survives,
A secular bird ages of lives.
— John Milton, Samson Agonistes
The greatest thoughts are the greatest events. 
— Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
The English phrase “This is the life!” is the sort of thing you are meant to ex-
claim when enjoying the goods of life in an extraordinary setting. Drinking
champagne on a yacht in Sydney harbour while the sun glitters from a perfect
blue sky, lying on a beach with attractive friends while the surf crashes against
pure yellow sands, sitting on the balcony of a large country house while eating
prime beef cooked by an inventive chef, or celebrating at a party where every-
one is dressed only in the most elegant and expensive season’s fashions  — you
get the picture. 
This picture is precisely one to which any self-respecting philosopher would im-
mediately respond: “Now that is not the life!” But why? What could possibly be
wrong with the democratic drive to make such utopian experiences accessible
in principle to everyone?
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Precisely to the extent that such bucolic pleasures fail to touch on the immedi-
acy of an idea — indeed, patently engage an idealised zero-degree media image
of yuppie enjoyment from which all traces of physical pain, work, exploitation,
competition, violence, murder, aging, ugliness and thought have been carefully
purged — they constitute a rebarbative parody of living, a kind of rapacious mate-
rialism whose picturesque alibi dissimulates its repulsive truth. An exemplarily re-
sentful truth, moreover, whose global circulation is merely one index of its
intellectual bankruptcy, and whose alleged “life” should rather be called the epit-
ome of “survival.” The insatiable human beast will be tamed by the promise of vac-
uous pleasures, at once entirely animal and entirely sublimated. On that yacht, for
instance, “you’re there only to enjoy what is there to be enjoyed” as Nicholas Heron
remarked to me.1 Less pointedly, leisure itself has turned into something patently
laborious, even violently exploitative: becoming-a-spectacle is almost a gladiato-
rial enterprise these days, not least given the number of yachts in the bay.
It’s clearly a problem of what Alain Badiou has recently termed “democratic ma-
terialism,” whose presuppositions involve something like the following.2 We are
materialists, that is, we know there is nothing except matter in this universe, no
creator, no sense, no purpose. The only purposes there are are ones we give our-
selves. We know we are all animals, mortal, fragile, transient, born to die. The
only thing it’s clear we share is death, which isn’t shared anyway. So we need to
squeeze life for all we can, without taking the slightest risk. Those who take risks
are clearly fantasists, in the grip of dangerous ideas, and, not least, most likely
curtailing their pleasures and shortening their lives. One cannot survive with
ideals; as we know from the crimes of the twentieth century, every ideal too
keenly pursued necessarily turns into its opposite, into totalitarian coercion, tor-
ture and death. The best, most democratic possible solution is to organise human
life in such a way as to minimize its pain and maximize its pleasures. And that,
precisely, is living. Against this, the embittered philosopher can only mutter im-
potently: “Herd animals! Ultimate men!”
A question, perhaps even a philosophical one, remains: why, against the bucolic
dreams of commodity capital, do a range of contemporary philosophers routinely
find themselves proselytising for an absolute value — “Life” — whose definition
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1 Personal correspondence. I would like to thank Jessica Whyte and Sigi Jottkandt for their com-
ments on a draft of this paper.
2 See A. Badiou, Logics of Worlds, trans. A. Toscano (New York: Continuum, 2009). 
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must be more than merely negative, yet cannot, by definition, be given any parti -
cu lar content? The answer can be given as a proper name: Friedrich Nietzsche.
Why? Because there is no philosophy of the future which does not still have to re -
ckon with the “revaluation of all values” that Nietzsche undertakes, and for which
the master-word remains that of “Life”. Moreover, Nietzsche’s program insists on
linking the concept with the problem of ethics, at the most fundamental level.3
“Life”, for Nietzsche, is nonetheless not itself a value, for it has to be that which
conditions the possibility of all values, as well as determining the necessity for
their ceaseless revaluation. It is inconsistent yet absolute, transient yet indu-
bitable. Moreover, and integrally connected with this, “Life” has to be a self-pro-
fessedly paradoxical word, one which enjoins the necessity of its own destruction
or supplantation. In order to truly live, as Nietzsche says, sometimes the organ-
ism has to be strong enough to die.
This might suggest that “Life” is a suicidal word. And indeed it is, as we’ll see in
more detail below. Life is a suicidal act and “Life” is a suicidal word, although
usually there aren’t any scare quotes to alert you to the resemblances.4 Nietzsche
thoughtfully fails to provide any. Paradoxically enough, then, it is the spirit that
kills for Nietzsche, while the letter delivers life — even if the life that is popped
through the letterbox turns out to be some kind of time bomb. And the only agent
able to deliver this life-bomb is an experimental, evolutionary, philological phi-
losophy, one which destroys what it must presume, and relentlessly returns to
what it must abandon, all the while negating itself as the word.5 Self-annihilat-
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3 Nietzsche: “It has gradually become clearer to me what every great philosophy has hitherto
been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious mem-
oir; moreover, that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy have every time con-
stituted the real germ of life out of which the entire plant has grown.” Beyond Good and Evil:
Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. with an intro. and commentary R.J. Hollingdale
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), p. 19.
4 As such, Nietzsche’s later philosophy remains conditioned by his assertion that “Greek tragedy
perished differently from all the other, older sister-arts: it died by suicide, as the result of an ir-
resolvable conflict, which is to say tragically, while all the others died the most beautiful and
peaceful deaths, fading away at a great age”. The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. R.
Geuss and R. Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 54.
5 As Gilles Deleuze phrases this: “[L]ife goes beyond the limits that knowledge fixes for it, but
thought goes beyond the limits that life fixes for it. Thought ceases to be a ratio, life ceases to
be a reaction. The thinker thus expresses the noble affinity of thought and life: life making 
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ing vitality, it is not nothing even if it never quite attains being never simply not.
Hardly ironical, though, its obliteration cannot not leave a residue.
To affirm an idea for Nietzsche means to actively place oneself in situations in
which the absolute contingency of existence is patent; more precisely, to place
oneself in situations in which one’s own life is clearly at risk and, in doing so, to
open oneself to affects that are keyed directly to the necessity of (self) destruc-
tion.6 In this sense, there is only one idea for Nietzsche, that of “eternal return”,
which literally means: since each must die, each moment is singular; each sin-
gularity has a claim; affirm the claim of that singularity; its temporality is by def-
inition not that of a series, of number, or of order; to affirm it demands your
distress; to embrace that distress is the definition of living, since living is itself
only transient exposure to death. 
Moreover, one is only properly individuated (perhaps “singularized” would be a
better word) in this relation to the moment and to distress; otherwise, one is only
“one”, at best an “ultimate” or “last man”, whose existence can only be denomi-
nated “survival” since no claim matters more than persistence in existence itself.
To be a last man is to refuse transience and contingency; even worse, in doing so,
to project a staid, stolid, resentful phantasm onto being and, in doing so, give being
a meaning — itself.7 The boast of the last men is, as Nietzsche puts it, not “we live!”
but “we survive!” (and then they of course “blink and cough”). The last man is the
one who thinks that existence and meaning coincide, and that existence is self-
supporting. This gives us the negative example of one kind of “nihilist”, here in
the full nihilistic blossoming at the arse-end of world history.8
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thought active, thought making life affirmative.” Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. H. Tomlinson
(New York: Continuum, 2006), p. 95.
6 In this context, Robert Solomon’s work is right to recognise that, beyond his maintenance of
Aristotelian virtues such as “courage” and “generosity” as well as the “distinctively Nietzschean
virtues” such as “exuberance” and “risk-taking,” there are a range of “crypto-virtues” projected
by Nietzsche’s writings such as “health” and “strength” “which throw open again the entire
question, ‘What is a virtue?’” Living with Nietzsche: What the Great “Immoralist” Has to Teach
Us (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 167.
7 As Randall Havas notes of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, “Life is, in short, the uncondi-
tioned condition of itself. Nihilism is the result of our unwillingness to acknowledge this fact.”
“Who is Heidegger’s Nietzsche? (On the Very Idea of the Present Age)” in H. Dreyfus and H.
Hall (eds.), Heidegger: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), p. 234.
8 For an account of the abiding influence of Nietzsche’s analysis of the challenge of nihilism to 
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Existence, however, is properly meaningless, because meaning can only be the
outcome of a process of interpretation, and there is no “project” that can coun-
teract this situation without falsification. Or, rather, existence itself is the out-
come of an interpretation. This is why Nietzsche’s self-proclaimed effort to “break
the history of the world in two” is simply the effort to affirm the singularity of
this, here, now, which must, by definition, have neither relation nor stability —
nor, indeed, possible description. There can be no project or program for life.
The idea is not an ideal. (The latter depends on the positing of another world,
which is precisely what has been destroyed by nihilism). For this-here-now is ap-
pearing-disappearing itself, which is exactly why it returns eternally, if only as
absolute difference, without consistency or coherence, without identity or num-
ber. To affirm it is to be destroyed as such. And the decision to affirm it is neither
life nor death nor survival nor nothingness. 
Nietzsche’s fundamental equation is thus the following: Life = this-here-now-yes.
But to choose life is itself a syncopation, the necessary preliminary to life, with-
out itself being life. Nothing in life is able to function as a guide to the decision,
since life is what is attained by or through such a decision; into the bargain, since
each singularity is indeed that, singular, no pre-existing code can function as
guidance, only as restraint and curb on life. Each achieved decision changes the
very meaning of life, which means that life is what escapes meaning. (This is why
Badiou is right, against Deleuze, to hold that Nietzsche is not aiming at sense, but
at the unevaluable.9) It is in the wake of the decisions of others that the limits of
the meaning of life are set and, hence, the limits upon which succeeding gener-
ations must decide to dispense with. The decision for life is the decision to dis-
pense with the past, at the limits that that past — that is, the life-affirming
decisions of others — has itself set. So, don’t be resentful, affirm the past that
you had to suffer, because it is a sequence of life-scars; just don’t think that’s it,
either. You will just have to say yes backwards, and yes forwards, and this yes, yes
will be linked by the truncated twist of a comma or a minimal gap that is the asig-
nifying trace of the vanished decision itself. As such, no-one will survive the de-
cision. No-one can survive life, only attain it in an “untimely” fashion, the
dimensionless hinge that binds the double-faces of Janus.
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thought, see my own The Romanticism of Contemporary Theory: Institution, Aesthetics, Nihilism
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), esp. pp. 81–96; also J. Clemens and J. Roffe, “Philosophy as Anti-
Religion in the Work of Alain Badiou,” Sophia, Vol. 47 (2008), pp. 345–358.
9 See A. Badiou, “Who is Nietzsche?” in Pli, Vol. 11 (2001), pp. 1–11.
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This is why Nietzsche is not, pace Heidegger, the last metaphysician, nor, pace
Badiou, an exemplary anti-philosopher (though he is indeed an “anti-meta-
physician” on his own terms).10 On the contrary, he is an existentialist philoso-
pher, one for whom singular affect-decision-affirmations deserve the name of
“Life”. Being is nothing other than what is attained by such decisions, and such
being must be given the name of “life”, because it is not survival, nor persist-
ence, nor diligence, nor existence, nor truth, nor… Life is the hole of the whole.
But to know at which point a decision must be made requires a genealogy —
whether of morals or whatever — precisely because otherwise one’s decision will
be arbitrary or useless. One needs to localise oneself with accuracy, otherwise
there is no living. Go to the limit of the decisions of the past, and then find one-
self on the edge of the abyss. Decide to jump. Whether you survive or die is of no
philosophical nor political interest at that point; that you have lived in the leap,
by leaping, must be affirmed as the philosophico-political moment. Glancing
backwards, a successfully-affirmed decision will have been the establishment of
a new limit; in the present, it projects something entirely other, something dead
and deadening to be overcome, and a future that is a chaos to be cut into. Life will
have been an experiment, not an experience. 
Nietzsche, as Laurence Lampert reminds us, was a scientist, trained in one of
the most important and rigorous university disciplines of his day: philology.11
This has four immediate consequences. It is because he was scientist of letters —
and a professor, too, although not such a good one under many descriptions —
that Nietzsche became a radically materialist philosopher. An immanent, mate-
rial basis must be offered for all claims. Second, those materials must be literal,
literally literal. It is in terms of letters — their emergence, disposition, reproduc-
tion, transmission, mutation and destruction — that the world must be con-
ceived. Third, as a materialist, one must track the combinations, permutations
and mutations of letters if one is to track the becoming of beings. Fourth, one
must affirm that every transformative event must be a literal one; or, more pre-
JUSTIN CLEMENS
10 See M. Heidegger, Nietzsche. Volume IV: Nihilism, trans. F.A. Capuzzi, edited, with notes and
an analysis. D.F. Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), as well as various other essays,
such as “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead,’” in The Question Concerning Technology and
Other Essays, trans. with intro. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977); Badiou, op. cit.
11 See L. Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
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cisely, leave its traces in the forms and dispositions of the letters that the letters
themselves cannot say.
The work of genealogy is, for Nietzsche, the necessary interval between ontol-
ogy (the recognition of the necessary transient contingency of existence) and de-
cision (the overcoming of limits through affirmation of existence), because it
provides the trajectory of one’s own herd, to the point where one can literally be-
come head of the herd. At that point is power, the head of the herd that is the
past as will-to-power, the world itself. Yet to decide necessarily takes you out of
the world, beyond power and existence in the affirmation of both. If the artist or
adventurer-killer is the preferred emblem for Nietzsche, this is only as a punctual
dissimulating marker, not a memorial-stone or starry-pointing pyramid. If world
is nothing except will-to-power, life is not world, is not a world. There are not
and cannot be any memorials that abide, without themselves weighing the living
down with the weight — not even of the dead — but of their inscriptions. What is
there must be reconstructed. You have to reconstruct your ontogenesis in order
to overgo it. Nothing demands (nor ensures) that any of it can or has to be true.
It only has to be effective, and the only signature of that effectivity must be the
untimely, getting it all wrong. 
Camel, Lion, Child, says Nietzsche in Zarathustra.12 This means: genealogy, nega-
tion, resurrection. Or: philology, profanation, creation. Or, again: persistence,
obliteration, play. The procedure, then, is clear: 1) a genealogical reconstruction
of the processes of emergence of our received ideas (the division of worlds, moral-
ity, nihilism); 2) an immanent destruction of received ideas (truth, history, God,
being, all the idols of the tribe, etc.); 3) the affirmative production of new ideas
(eternal return, will-to-power, etc.). Not that eternal return, will-to-power, the
Over-Man, etc., can ever be the last word — although they are the self-assaulting
traces of this process, which can expose itself only as misdirection. 
Not any species can achieve all three, perhaps on earth only those clever ani-
mals who once happened to invent cognition. Still, the clever animals will have
to die, tant pis, no matter how puffed up like balloons they might be — and that’s
just the way it goes. In any case, a genealogy assaults both history and species-
29
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12 See F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. G. Parkes (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), pp. 23–24.
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being. So, just like a very clever philologist, the Over-Man is the one who’s pre-
pared to read exceptionally closely, glancing forwards and backwards at once,
rereading again, dwelling in the lines.13 Nietzsche is that philologist who recog-
nises that even letters are evolutionary, that letters breed with each other, in-
termingle promiscuously, and in the vast orgy that is world literature, produce
monsters which — if they are abhorrent from the point of view of any individual
morality — may nevertheless prove indispensable for the continuation of the
species. Littoral-monsters, whose footprints can be discerned upon the face of
the species as a whole (as one says “genetic footprint” these days, as in “Genghis
Khan has the biggest genetic footprint in history”).
To read is already to reproduce, and if one thinks one does it for edification, even
merely for pleasure, one is rather being overtaken from behind, rammed in an un-
natural hole from which may later, perhaps, issue more monsters. This isn’t like
being forced into mastery, as today, where everyone has the power to choose, or,
to put it more bluntly, shows him- or herself incapable of refusing the position of
the-one-who-chooses-within-life. This is at once why nihilism is very close to Ni-
etzsche (“a perfected nihilist”), and also so distant: the one-who-must-choose-
within-life is selecting from possibilities that life offers, not choosing for life. It’s not
for this or that that the Over-Man decides, nor is it for the whole. The Over-Man is
the man who’s prepared to take himself out, possibly quite literally, in becoming-
other-than-man, in vanishing through the hole of the whole.
“Man is a herd animal”: this means, above all, that man is led by the tracks he
has laid down in his own past. It is not simply a doctrine that holds that men are
more willingly followers than leaders, although it is difficult to see how that isn’t
true for Nietzsche too. It is much rather a doctrine about the ways in which men
are able to turn themselves into followers of their own established patterns of
behaviour; that is, it is a question of memory, whether voluntary or not, which
founds unthought repetition; and such a memory can only ultimately be founded
in pain, the true educator.14 The pain is gone, if its traces remain; it is the dead
JUSTIN CLEMENS
13 As Nietzsche puts it in his “Preface” to Daybreak, “this art does not so easily get anything
done, it teaches to read well, that is to say, to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and
aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers...”, Daybreak:
Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, intro. M. Tanner (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 5.
14 “Only great pain is the liberator of the spirit, as the teacher of the great suspicion that turns
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traces of the pain in their own experience that lead men on, in all senses of that
phrase, like sirens to the rocks or to the factories. To teach man to become other
than a herd animal, other than through the whip or the knout — this is then Ni-
etzsche’s fundamental paradox. Zarathustra must be a “re-educator” through
something other than purely physical pain; it must be by thought, by an event of
thought.
This thought must therefore present itself as anti-metaphysical counter-seduc-
tion. It has to combat enemies on at least two fronts: first, the yuppies on the bay
and their libidinous entertainments; next, the clumsy, ugly, charmless meta-
physicians who couldn’t seduce the proverbial village wench using all their
lumpen fingers and tongues. Nietzsche berates, as usual, the Germans for their
enthusiasm for clothes which take no intelligence to design, and no time to put
on, for their sodden beeriness and good marching thighs. Yet he does generate a
third enemy as a result of these polemical seductions: his own style. His style
must fight against itself if it is not to fail its own re-educational test, on the one
hand, or the tendency to become a self-annihilating string of pearls, on the other.
If it causes too much pleasure or pain, it risks becoming merely aesthetic or
moralistic, eminently ornamental or reactively power-hungry.
How else can Nietzsche’s own war against himself then be properly expressed
or rather disclosed, except in the terms drawn from sex? Life must mate with
death, and man with woman. Nietzsche has to be both a man and a woman, and
the “feminization of European culture” against which he rages is as much a sly
admission of the necessity for him to be a cross-dresser, a hot transvestite driven
to this fate by the sorry hand of history.15 His seduction must be universal in ad-
dress, if only a very few will take up its challenge. He cannot by his own lights
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every U into an X, a real, proper X, that is, the penultimate one before the final one.” The Gay
Science, ed. B. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 6. This is, of course,
a corollary of Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals, in which torture is the agent of world-historical
mnemotechnics, ultimately interiorised as conscience and consecrated in the confessional.
15 An entirely typical example of Nietzschean ranting in this regard: “To be sure, there are suffi-
cient idiotic friends and corrupters of woman among the learned asses of the male sex who ad-
vise woman to defeminize herself in this fashion and to imitate all the stupidities with which
‘man’ in Europe, European ‘manliness’, is sick — who would like to reduce woman to the level of
‘general education’, if not to that of newspaper reading and playing at politics.” Beyond Good
and Evil, p. 149. Nietzsche needs this misogyny, as much a part of his esoteric confession of the
necessity of radical self-estrangement, as for his own strategy of seductive counter-seduction.
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identify this handful in advance, since to do so would be according to established
routines of recognition; he must essay to seduce unknown men and women of all
kinds into becoming who they are. Zarathustra is, notoriously, for “everyone and
no-one”. The esoteric kernel of Nietzsche’s philosophy can be discerned in his
staging of the war of thought as a struggle against desexualization. 
Alenka Zupančič has noted that the comic aspect of Nietzsche’s style derives from
life reflecting upon itself in an entirely immanent way.16 Life is in the irresolvable
self-conflict of the style. Yet what else could exemplify the absolute humour of
this immanent self-differentiation better than sex? Or, rather, by the exposure of
the necessity of one sex to assume through polemical distortion the sex of the
other as a strategy of style? Let’s not forget that “genealogy” is a word insepara-
ble from the problematic of breeding stock, whether we’re talking animals or aris-
tocracy.17 And let’s also not forget that Nietzsche’s “genealogies” must therefore
finally be about the unintended, ungraspable, ambivalent consequences of mat-
ing with the other (man with woman, the living with the dead, etc.), and not about
purity of bloodlines. On the contrary, the inbreeding of blue blood spells
haemophilia; true thought must first mate with the dead if it is to have any issue.
Which is, once again, and according to Zeno’s interpretation of the Delphic Ora-
cle, equivalent to reading books, philo-logy in the fullest sense of the word.18
Despite his well-deserved personal reputation for lowering the tone of social
gatherings, Nietzsche remains the life of the party because he found he could
only give birth to himself by fucking himself — and then fucking himself over.
(One may have to conclude in a slightly embarrassed way by adding that whoever
feels that words such as these are inappropriate in philosophy must have for-
gotten the founding writings of philosophy itself. Philosophy is a party, a sym-
posium, and the main thing is to stick with it whether you’re a teetotaller, pissed
JUSTIN CLEMENS
16 A. Zupančič, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two (London & Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2003).
17 On the problem of good breeding and humanism, see P. Sloterdijk’s boutade, only recently
(and belatedly) translated into English, as “Rules for the Human Zoo: a response to the Letter
on Humanism,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol. 27 (2009), pp. 12–28.
18 See J. Derrida’s brilliant reading of Ecce Homo in The Ear of the Other: otobiography, transference,
translation, trans. A. Ronell et al. (University of Nebraska Press, 1988), esp. “Inasmuch as I am and
follow after my father, I am the dead man and I am death. Inasmuch as I am and follow after my
mother, I am life that perseveres, I am the living and the living feminine. I am my father, my
mother, and me, death and life, the dead man and the living feminine, and so on.” p. 16.
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as a newt or just badly hung-over, and keep on agonising about the dictates of Di-
otima). Here, then, at an end that is also a new beginning, we rediscover a radi-
cal variation on the eternal image of the phoenix, that sole Arabian bird that
consumes itself in fire in order to be reborn from its own ashes. Just try doing
that on Sydney Harbour.
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